Automation tax vs robot-tax by OOI, Vincent
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Law School of Law
3-2019
Automation tax vs robot-tax
Vincent OOI
Singapore Management University, vincentooi@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research
Part of the Artificial Intelligence and Robotics Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
This Blog Post is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
OOI, Vincent. Automation tax vs robot-tax. (2019). Research Collection School Of Law.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/2899
  
SMU Classification: Restricted 
Automation Tax vs Robot-Tax 
Vincent Ooi 
19 Mar 2019 
 
 
 
OBLB Keywords: Taxation, Tax Law, Robot Tax, Automation Tax, Capital 
Allowances 
 
The positive impact of developments in technology on the economy has 
historically outweighed the disruptive impact on employment. Society has 
benefited from the efficiency gains derived from the application of technology 
in production, while workers displaced by these technologies have largely been 
successfully retrained and employed in other jobs. However, the pace of 
development of the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” now presents a risk of mass 
displacement of human labour, particularly in tasks that are repetitive and 
menial. The “Fourth Industrial Revolution” is characterised by significant 
progress in a closely-linked cluster of areas such as robot dexterity, machine 
learning, processing power, and sensor capabilities, which reduce the costs of 
automation and enhance its potential benefits. 
  
While most workers will be able to continue in their roles after job alteration, 
for instance, through being trained to operate the machines which now perform 
their old jobs, some workers may be unable to retain their jobs post-automation 
because they lack all the skills required to perform the redesigned job 
(structural unemployment). 
Worker displacement as a consequence of automation generates the social costs of 
supporting and retraining displaced workers, which constitute a negative externality, 
resulting in market failure. The idea of a “robot tax” (a range of proposals attempting 
to tax the use of machines which replace human workers) has been debated in several 
jurisdictions as a response to the increasing adoption of automation technologies, 
which threaten to displace large numbers of workers. Proposals for a “robot tax” have 
largely faced difficulties in defining the concept of a “robot” as a unit on which to 
base the tax. In my recent paper with Glendon Goh, “Taxation of Automation and 
Artificial Intelligence as a Tool of Labour Policy”, we consider an “automation tax”, 
identifying the core problem as the unemployment caused by workers being made 
redundant as they are replaced by automation technologies, rather than the less certain 
concept of a “robot tax”.  
The “automation tax” proposed in our paper is aimed to correct the above market 
failure. The appropriate policy response is not to impose a blanket tax on automation 
as the proponents of a robot tax suggest, but instead to recognise the distinction 
between automation’s employment-substituting and employment-complementing 
effects, incentivising the latter and disincentivising the former. Employment-
substituting technologies perform the same tasks which human workers currently 
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perform, rendering human workers redundant. On the other hand, employment-
complementing technologies are used by human workers to enhance their 
productivity, by allowing them to expand the range of tasks which they can perform.  
The aims of an automation tax are twofold: first, to slow the introduction of 
automation technology in industries which would otherwise suffer rapid and massive 
unemployment as a result of automation, so as to provide as much time as possible for 
governments, welfare systems, and workers to prepare for the impending effects of 
structural unemployment; second, to impose a tax on companies that automate, so as 
to generate revenue for the support and re-skilling of displaced workers. Regulators 
must take care to only adopt these policy responses in cases where structural 
unemployment is widespread, irreversible, and clearly attributable to automation. 
Such cases are likely to be small in number.  
Our paper recognises the theoretical difficulties in attempting to define a measurable 
unit such as “robots” or “jobs displaced”, and the practical difficulties in attempting to 
compute the tax due even if such a unit could be successfully define. We propose that 
the “automation tax” could be introduced through changes to the existing system of 
depreciation/ capital allowances. The deductibility of capital investments should vary 
depending on the effect of the capital investment on employment. Such a tax would 
provide a policy tool for the Government to control the rate at which automation 
displaces human workers. As automation may affect employment in a myriad of 
different and unpredictable ways, the ideal automation tax would have to be flexible 
enough to keep up with rapid technological developments. As such, the 
comprehensive schedules used in depreciation/ capital allowances regimes are 
particularly suitable for this task. This approach has the benefit of sidestepping the 
tricky question of attempting to define a measurable unit to be taxed, and instead 
allows policy-makers to have the flexibility to set different tax rates for different 
assets, depending on the industry in which such assets are utilised. This proposal also 
has the added benefit of low administrative costs, as the existing system of capital 
allowances/ depreciation may be used, eliminating the need to design a new tax from 
scratch and train both administrators and users to use such a new system.  
The two main dimensions that may be adjusted to produce intended distortionary 
effects are: 1) accelerated depreciation, and 2) bonus depreciation. Accelerated 
depreciation is the allowance of deductions for declines in the value of an asset at 
higher rates than are expected to occur in practice. Bonus depreciation occurs where 
the taxpayer is allowed to deduct more than 100% of the cost of the capital asset. As a 
useful tool for governments to have on hand, an automation tax can be quickly 
implemented by building on the existing depreciation/ capital allowances framework 
where necessary. It can be used to manage the balance between the positive and 
negative externalities of automation and artificial intelligence by calibrating the level 
of their adoption through the use of these tax incentives. While the efficiency gains 
from the adoption of automation mean that the automation tax is unlikely to have 
widespread application, it does provide a useful tool for specific situations where the 
rate of automation needs to be slowed due to its resultant social costs.  
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